TWO HALAKHIC RESPONSA, AND WHAT THEY CONCLUDE
What does halakha say about women being represented and elected?
The halakhic position matters to us. It is set out here in brief, and the written rulings can be read in full at the foot of the page.
The quotations below are translated from Hebrew halakhic sources, with each original kept underneath its translation. Where a term carries the argument — serarah, the category of authority the whole question turns on — it is transliterated rather than flattened into English.
One halakhic question stands at the base of both works: is there a halakhic prohibition on appointing or electing a woman to public office, such as a member of Knesset, a director of a public company, or the head of an institution. Each work approaches the question in its own way, but they arrive at a largely similar conclusion: there is no sweeping halakhic prohibition on appointing women to offices of this kind, and in many cases it should even be encouraged.
"A Halakhic Clarification Concerning the Election of Women to Public Office" (Tevet 5775) was written by a rabbi who chose to remain anonymous, and treats the question broadly; appended to it is a separate section of answers the author received, orally and in writing, from Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky zt"l. Rabbi Refael Kroizer's responsum (18 Tammuz 5785), "On the Election of Women to Serve as Members of Knesset", is focused more narrowly on membership of the Knesset, and is built as an ordered halakhic responsum in eight sections.
A.The source of the prohibition, and how far it was accepted as law
Both works open from the same starting point: the Rambam's ruling (Laws of Kings 1:5): "A woman is not appointed to kingship, as it says: 'set a king over you' (a king and not a queen). And likewise all appointments in Israel are filled only by a man." Its source is the Sifrei (Deuteronomy, Shoftim). Both authors ask what the Rambam's source is for extending the prohibition from "kingship" alone to "all appointments in Israel", and note that this is not agreed upon by all the Rishonim.
Many have wondered what the Rambam's source for this ruling is, and leading Rishonim disagreed with him (Rashi, Tosafot, the Rosh, the Ran, the Ramban, and in the view of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, the Rashba as well; see Responsa Igrot Moshe, Yoreh De'ah II:45).
רבים תמהו מהו מקור הרמב"ם להלכה זו, ואף מגדולי הראשונים חלקו על הרמב"ם (רש"י, תוס', הרא"ש, הר"ן, הרמב"ן ולדעת הגאון ר' משה פיינשטיין גם הרשב"א, עיין שו"ת אגרות משה יורה דעה חלק ב סימן מה).
It appears still more strongly that this ruling was not accepted as law, since the Tur, the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema all omitted it. Were it to apply to every position of serarah it would apply in our own time as well, and their omission suggests they held it to be a law concerning a king alone and not other positions of serarah.
וביותר נראה להוכיח שדין זה אינו מוסכם להלכה שהרי הטור ושולחן ערוך ורמ"א השמיטו דין זה, ואם הוא נוהג בכל השררות הרי הוא נוהג בזמן הזה ונראה מהשמטתם שסבירי להו שאין זה אלא דין במלך ולא בשאר שררות.
B."Appointment" versus "acceptance": does a democratic election carry the status of serarah
This is the central axis on which the two works meet and reinforce one another, though each reaches it from a slightly different set of sources. The kuntres rests mainly on Rabbi Meir Uziel's distinction between appointment (authority imposed from above) and acceptance (the consent of the electing public). Rabbi Kroizer reaches the same result by way of Tosafot in tractate Yevamot, which define "serarah" as contingent on coercive power.
Acceptance: whereby through the elections the majority of the public gives its judgement, its consent and its trust to those elected, so that they act as its representatives in overseeing all its public affairs. On this even the Rambam concedes that there is not the slightest trace of a prohibition.
קבלה, שעל ידי הבחירות מכריע רוב הקהל את דעתו הסכמתו ואמונו לאותם הנבחרים, שהם יהיו באי כחו לפקח על כל עניניהם הצבוריים, ועל זה אפילו הרמב"ם מודה שאין כאן שום שמץ של אסור.
A member of Knesset does not express a personal opinion, but the view and the will of the leading rabbis of the generation and of their teachers... The role of women members of Knesset is to carry out the will of the public, not to exercise authority of their own. No question of serarah arises in passive election.
חבר הכנסת איננו מביע את דעתו האישית, אלא את דעת גדולי הדור ומוריו ואת רצונם... תפקיד חברות בכנסת הוא למלאות את רצון הציבור ולא להפעיל את סמכותן. שאלה של שררה אין במינוי הפסיבי.
Appointment and matters of serarah, as it is written, "you shall surely set a king over you" (Deuteronomy 17), apply only where there is coercion... On this basis one may argue that since a member of Knesset holds no coercive power, coercive power belonging only to the court and to the king... a member of Knesset, not falling under coercion, does not fall under "all appointments that you make"... and the same applies to appointing a woman.
דלא שייכא שימה ודבר של שררה דכתיב שום תשים עליך מלך (דברים יז) אלא בכפייה... ולפי זה יש לדון כיוון שחבר כנסת אין לו כוח כפייה שכוח הכפייה אינו אלא לבית הדין ולמלך... אבל חבר כנסת כיוון שאינו בכלל כפייה אינו בכלל כל משימות שאתה משים... והוא הדין למינוי אשה.
Even according to the Rambam, who holds that a woman may not be appointed to other positions of serarah, the definition of serarah is one who can command others to carry out his will and is not subordinate to them. On this basis, a woman member of Knesset (being subordinate to the will of the voters, obliged to act within the authority the voters gave her, and holding no power of serarah to command others) does not fall within the category of serarah at all.
אף להרמב"ם הסובר שאין למנות אשה לשאר שררות, הרי גדר שררה הוא שיכול לצוות על אחרים לעשות רצונו ואינו כפוף להם, ולפי זה חברת כנסת כיוון שכפופה לרצון הבוחרים וצריכה לפעול לפי הסמכות שנתנו לה הבוחרים ואין לה כח שררה לצוות על אחרים הרי אין זה בכלל שררות.
C.Serarah as an inherited status: a distinctive addition in Rabbi Kroizer's responsum
Rabbi Kroizer adds an independent element, resting on the position of Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli (Responsa Chavot Binyamin §12), according to which "serarah" in its classical halakhic sense is specifically a status passed on by inheritance, and he draws an explicit conclusion from this regarding women members of Knesset.
Kingship means conferring on a particular family the standing of royal lineage. That is why, when the king dies, another of that family (and no one else) takes his place... Only a position passed on by inheritance carries the law of serarah... An appointment that is not inherited, all the more so one that runs for a limited term and can be removed at the will of the public, is not included in it.
מלכות – פירושה הקניית מעמד של זרע המלוכה למשפחה זו. שמשום כך כשמת המלך, ממלא מקומו אחר מבני המשפחה הזאת, ולא זולתה... רק זו שעוברת בירושה תורת שררה עליה... מינוי שאינו בירושה, מכל שכן שאינו אלא לזמן מוגבל, וניתן גם לסילוק ברצון הציבור, אינו בכלל זה.
The same applies to appointing women as members of Knesset, which bears no resemblance to serarah at all: both because it is not passed on by inheritance, and so is unlike those positions and appointments to which women are not appointed; and further, because the whole category of public representatives such as members of Knesset is one of people who hold no serarah or power of their own but are bound to the will of the public.
הוא הדין במינוי נשים לחברות כנסת שאינו דומה כלל לשררה, הן מחמת שאין זה עובר בירושה ואם כן אינו דומה לשררות ולמינויים שבהם אין למנות נשים. ועוד שכל גדר נבחרי ציבור כחברי כנסת שאינם בעלי שררה ויכולת אלא משועבדים לרצון הציבור.
To this Rabbi Kroizer adds the words of Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch (Teshuvot veHanhagot I §838; III §305), that a role which is not inherited and is not "an appointment of honour" (running an institution, for instance) is not included in serarah, and so a woman or a convert may be appointed to it.
D.The gabbai model: public acceptance, and acting together with others
Both works draw on the same cluster of sources: the Jerusalem Talmud (Kiddushin 4:5), the Meiri, the Knesset HaGedolah and the Tumim, which discuss the validity of appointing a convert as a gabbai of charity despite the requirement "from among your brethren", and they apply that permission to our question as well.
A member of Knesset likewise does not act alone but as part of the majority in the Knesset, which can act with the power of the public; no individual among them has the right to act on their own, only by force of the majority. Accordingly, the position of the Meiri cited above may also be brought to bear, as Rabbi Ovadia Yosef adduced it.
גם חבר כנסת אינו פועל יחידי אלא הוא חלק מן הרוב בכנסת שיכולים לפעול בכוח הציבור ואין לכל אחד ואחד מהם זכות לפעול לבדו אלא רק מכוח הרוב, ואם כן יש לצרף גם שיטת המאירי הנ"ל וכפי שהביא מרן הגר"ע יוסף.
It was likewise the practice of Jewish communities to appoint women as gabba'ot of charity, as is recounted of the wife of the Vilna Gaon, who was a gabbait of charity; an account Rabbi Elazar Menachem Man Shach brought in Michtavim uMa'amarim... and on old gravestones one finds a woman praised with the title of gabbait of charity.
כן היה מנהג קהילות ישראל למנות נשים כגבאיות צדקה, כמו שמסופר המעשה על אשת רבינו הגר"א שהייתה גבאית צדקה, והביא מעשה זה הגראמ"ש שך במכתבים ומאמרים... וכן במצבות עתיקות נמצא כינוי שבח לאשה שהייתה גבאית צדקה.
E."The time will come and decide": from Rabbi Weinberg to the present
The kuntres opens by presenting the well-known responsum of Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg (Seridei Esh) from Chanukah 5711, which declined to rule on women voting and standing for election and set out three positions: some prohibit; some permitted both voting and standing (Rabbi Meir Uziel); and some permitted voting but forbade standing (Rabbi David Zvi Hoffmann), which is how people acted in practice.
The questioner wished to know whether women may vote and stand for election. Rabbi Weinberg gave him a brief answer carrying no ruling... three positions on the matter... but Rabbi Weinberg did not wish to decide, and left the matter to be decided one day.
השואל רצה לדעת אם מותר לנשים לבחור ולהיבחר. הרב וינברג ענה לו תשובה קצרה שאין הכרעה בצידה... שלוש שיטות בדבר... אלא שהגרי"י וינברג לא חפץ להכריע והותיר את הדבר שיוכרע ביום מן הימים.
The question is whether the time has not come to take the matter up again, and to ask whether we may permit women to stand for election as well.
השאלה היא אם לא הגיע הזמן לשוב ולדון אם נוכל להתיר לנשים אף להיבחר.
Rabbi Kroizer's responsum does not address the Weinberg–Uziel debate directly, but in practice arrives at the same position on the level of halakhic principle.
F.The consideration of modesty
The kuntres devotes a full chapter to this, citing Rabbi Uziel's principle that the laws of modesty depend on time and place, and that a businesslike encounter between the sexes is not in itself immodesty. Rabbi Kroizer, more focused on the question of serarah, turns to modesty only towards the end, and there as an argument in support.
Reason dictates that in any serious assembly and constructive discussion there is no immodesty. Day after day men meet women in commercial dealings and negotiate with them, and still there is no breach and no outcry. Even the most licentious have no forbidden thoughts while they are seriously engaged in their business.
הסברא נותנת לומר דבכל כנסיה רצינית ושיחה מועילה אין בה משום פריצות, וכל יום ויום האנשים נפגשים עם הנשים במשא ומתן מסחרי, ונושאים ונותנים, ובכל זאת אין שום פרץ ושום צוחה. ואפילו היותר פרוצים בעריות, לא יהרהרו באיסור בשעה שעוסקים ברצינות במסחרם.
It may be that electing women to these roles bears on help for women and their needs... and it would be more in keeping with modesty for them to find a listening ear with women members of Knesset, without having to approach male officials, and there may be great benefit in this.
אפשר שיש בבחירת נשים לתפקידים אלו השפעה על עזרה לנשים וצרכיהן... ומדרכי הצניעות יהיה להן אוזן קשבת אצל חברות כנסת ולא יצטרכו לבוא בקשר עם ממונים גברים ויכול להיות בזה תועלת מרובה.
G.The answers of Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky (appended to the kuntres)
Alongside the kuntres its author brings answers he received, orally and in writing, from Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky zt"l, concerning the appointment of women to boards of directors and similar public appointments:
Asked how women are appointed as school principals and the like, he answered: "What pertains to women is permitted." Asked about appointing a woman to a board of directors, he answered: "The same as above." Asked why the Shulchan Aruch mentions the prohibition on appointing converts to positions of serarah and to appointments, yet mentions no parallel prohibition regarding women, he answered: "It is obvious."
לשאלה כיצד ממנים נשים למנהלות בתי ספר וכדומה, השיב: "מה ששייך לנשים מותר". לשאלה בדבר מינוי אשה לחברת דירקטוריון, השיב: "כנ"ל". לשאלה מדוע השולחן ערוך מזכיר את איסור מינוי גרים לשררות ומשימות ואינו מזכיר איסור מקביל לגבי נשים, השיב: "הוא פשוט".
The kuntres notes that these answers, brief as they are, sit well with the conclusion in principle that it develops from the sources.
H.The two authors' conclusions
Rabbi Kroizer's responsum closes with an explicit summary, listing five cumulative grounds for permitting it:
1. The Shulchan Aruch and the Rema did not bring the prohibition on appointing women to public office as law, and several Rishonim hold there is no impediment in it at all. 2. In an appointment carrying no coercive power there is no impediment even according to the Rambam, and likewise in a role that is not "an appointment of honour and serarah" but work for the public benefit. 3. Acceptance by the public validates an appointment, just as it validated the appointment of converts. 4. An appointment that is not passed on by inheritance is not included in serarah. 5. Where the appointee does not act alone but together with others, there is no impediment.
1. השולחן ערוך והרמ"א לא הביאו להלכה את איסור מינוי נשים למשרות ציבוריות, וכמה ראשונים סוברים שאין בזה מניעה כלל. 2. במינוי שאין בו כוח כפייה אין מניעה אף לשיטת הרמב"ם, וכן בתפקיד שאינו "מינוי של כבוד ושררה" אלא עבודה לתועלת הציבור. 3. קבלת הרבים מכשירה מינוי, כשם שהוכשר מינוי גרים. 4. מינוי שאינו עובר בירושה אינו בכלל שררה. 5. כאשר המינוי אינו לבדו אלא בצירוף עם אחרים אין מניעה.
In sum, it appears that the time has come to permit the passive election of women... No question of serarah arises in appointing a woman member of Knesset, since the role of women members of Knesset is to carry out the will of the public and not to exercise authority of their own... and if it will strengthen the standing of Torah in our land, it is forbidden to prevent their election.
בסיכום, נראה שהגיעה השעה להתיר את בחירת הנשים הפסיבית... שאלה של שררה אין במינוי חברת כנסת שכן תפקיד חברות בכנסת הוא למלאות את רצון הציבור ולא להפעיל את סמכותן... ואם הדבר יגרום להגברת כוח התורה בארצנו, אסור למנוע את בחירתן.
I.Where they meet: a shared picture
Though written by two different authors about a decade apart, both works are built on the same halakhic skeleton and very nearly the same body of sources (Rambam, Sifrei, Tosafot in Yevamot, the Ran, the Meiri, Igrot Moshe, and the historical record of women serving as gabba'ot of charity). The main points where they meet:
1. The Rambam's ruling forbidding the appointment of a woman to any "appointment in Israel" is not agreed upon: the Tur, the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema omitted it, and many Rishonim differ with it.
2. Even for those who rule with the Rambam, the serarah that is forbidden is independent coercive authority not subject to the will of others; an elected role that is subject to the will of the public is not "serarah" in that sense.
3. "Serarah" in its classical sense is a status passed on by inheritance; an elected role, limited in time and revocable by the public, does not fall within that definition.
4. Acceptance by the public ("they accepted it upon themselves") validates an appointment that would otherwise be in doubt, particularly where the appointee acts together with others rather than alone.
5. Practical considerations (preventing unsuitable candidates from being elected in place of fit ones, strengthening the standing of Torah, and avoiding desecration of God's name) also weigh towards permitting it.
Both authors nevertheless keep a careful and self-aware tone: the kuntres recommends proceeding in this matter "according to the instruction of our teachers", and Rabbi Kroizer's responsum closes by recommending that one act "after consulting the leading rabbis of Israel and following their instruction". The permission in principle is presented alongside an explicit call for the practical decision to rest with the leading rabbis of the generation in each given case.
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